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Abstract: The Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits transformed Turkey 
into a binder between continents and seas, but this geographical 
advantage is, at the same time, a geopolitical and geostrategic bone of 
contention, drawing arguments not only with the neighbouring states 
of the Black Sea, but also with the European powers, Russia in this 
case. The past two centuries are a long series of discussions and 
discordant episodes related to The Straits, especially after Turkey 
joined NATO and found itself in the position to be impartial toward 
The West and Russia. The current challenge is to find a neutral path, 
independent, and in the same time stronger, but will it be a satisfactory 
solution for all the involved actors and it will be this one a peaceful 
one? 
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Over the centuries, the states have been disputing the Straits territories, on 
the account of domination and hegemony. In the case of the great powers, these 
reasons have been translated through the gain of vast territories and political 
influences; in the contemporary period, through the control of the underground 
resources and of the key points, if we look from a geostrategic point of view. In 
order to understand a certain space from this perspective, we need, first of all, to 
set the borders, the temporal framing, the actors, and moreover, their interests and 
behaviour. 
The analysis of a situation like this one implies two types of geopolitical 
approaches: a historical one, focused on the past and on evolution that have shaped 
a certain space, and another one, which has a predictable character, and which 
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takes into account the projection of some scenarios with an anticipatory character1. 
However, this research will merge the two approaches,  and will try to analyze the 
resources and the economic profile of the chosen space, the behaviour of the 
implied actors, their potential, and especially the interests they have in that space. 
This kind of analysis can be applied to the context of The Black Sea Basin, 
more concretely, to the area of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, important 
territorial strips, not only for the resources, but also for their geographical position, 
which have transformed them into a geostrategic and geopolitical key for the 
Turkish Republic. 
The Bosphorus (30 km long) links the Black Sea to the Marmara Sea, and 
the Dardanelles (68 km long) links the latter to the Aegean Sea, the two of them 
separating Europe from Asia. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits have the 
status of international navigation ways, connecting the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea.2 From a political, economic, cultural and social point of view, 
they belong to the Turkish profile and they subordinate to its government.  
 
The Straits – the bone of contention in the Turkish-Soviet/Russian relations 
 
The Black Sea Basin has been disputed for a long time by the Ottoman 
Empire, the Russian Empire and other European powers and, after that, by the 
successors of these empires, but the change of its status was most frequent in the 
19th and the 20th centuries. The review of a few landmarks (The Treaty of 
Adrianople in 1829, The Treaty of Paris in 1856 after the Crimean War, the 
Versailles System of Treaties after World War I – The Treaty of Sèvres, the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923, the Montreux Convention of 1936) is illustrative: ever since 
1841, the control of the ships transit through The Straits has been under 
international control, and their status has been rediscussed and established in 
Montreux (1936), authorizing Turkey to militarize the strategic waters and, if 
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threatened by imminent war, to allow or reject the passing of war ships through the 
Straits.3 
Even if, territorially speaking, they are narrow geographical areas, through 
their position, they are geostrategic keys, which is the reason why the powers in 
the area have had an interest in changing their status. A defining moment of the 
20th century, for this space, is the Treaty of Lausanne (24th of July 1923), through 
which Turkey loses the full rights of possession over the Straits. The provisions 
guaranteed the free trade, but the principle of the free passing was restricted 
especially for warships, military aircraft and aircraft carrier: what a state could 
send through The Straits, during a war, did not have the right to exceed the 
dimensions of the dominant fleet in the Black Sea. Also, the states could “reserve 
themselves the right to send into the Black Sea, at all times and under all 
circumstances, a force of not more than three ships, of which no individual ship 
shall exceed 10,000 tons”.4  
Let us not forget that it was the blurry context, just before the World War 
II, when all the states were seeking for security and the Treaty of Lausanne was 
replaced by the Montreux Convention, which had reconfigured the status of The 
Straits. This allowed free access for the commercial navigation, but the military 
ships were again restricted; moreover, it limited the access of non-riparian states of 
the Black Sea to 21 days, a tonnage not bigger than 15,000 t, and maximum 9 
ships, which means that the aircraft carriers could not have been transported 
through The Straits.5 
Though the international regulations reconfigured the status of The Straits, 
it was not long until the incidents and dissensions reappeared. After the end of 
World War II, when Turkey oscillated between the West and Soviet Russia, a split 
in the Turkish-Soviet relations appeared, because of Russia’s wish to modify the 
status of The Straits to its advantage. The Turkish refusal led to the cancellation in 
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4
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1945 of the 1925 “Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Turkey”6, and 
this was just one of the cases of disagreement and challenge at the beginning of 
Cold War. 
 In 1976, the Russian naval vessel Kiev passed through The Straits, with 
Turkish approval, heading to the Mediterranean Sea. The question was, if the 
passage conditions through The Straits were fully respected, since the Soviets 
declared the ship as an antisubmarine cruiser, but, in fact, it was projected to carry 
about 25-30 fixed-wing aircraft and about 25-30 antisubmarine helicopters, and 
Turkish authorities were signaled that indeed, that is what the vessel was carrying. 
The ship passed through Bosphorus, the Marmara Sea, Dardanelles and docked in 
the south of Crete. The dilemma was, if this ship fit the provisions of the Montreux 
Convention or not, because there was no clear classification or concrete provision 
about this kind of vessel, as it was declared by the Soviets. 7 
Even after Cold War ended, the incidents did not stop, therefore, the 
Straits’ status was redefined through the addition of some new provisions, through 
the decision of the government in Ankara, following the Nassia oil tanker incident 
(1st of July 1994). The speed and the dimensions of the ships were limited, and 
Turkey was allowed to close the straits in case of fire, sport, or environmental 
activities.8 There is no need to mention how important the Straits are for the 
Turkish economy and foreign policy, one proof being that, in 2013 only, 45931 
ships have passed through the Bosphorus Strait, out of which 6886 were freight 
ones, and 1561 oil tankers, making it one of the most transited points in the world.9  
 
The current geostrategic and geopolitical importance of the Straits 
 
Certainly, the states from the Black Sea region would not have disputed 
over a few square kilometres, if that space had had no interest. Joshua Goldstein 
identifies the interests of a state in a region as: negotiable, non-negotiable and real 
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(which are not declared usually), and obviously, some material, political or cultural 
reasons can be added to these.10 The interests for this space did not belong to 
Turkey only, the 20th Century being a continuous argument between the European 
powers: Great Britain and Russia had divergent positions when the Montreux 
Convention was negotiated, while Soviet Russia and Turkey tried to negotiate 
several times after the Convention was signed in 1936 (Yalta, also Potsdam - when 
the USSR tried to obtain a privileged passing status through The Straits).11  
Taking the recent context of Ukraine, Turkey could not rally to the Russian 
interests and trajectories, because of the tartars living on territories under Russian 
influence, but neither could it have a firm negative position, because of the 
dependency on the Russian gas (the Blue Stream pipeline, in this case). According 
to the provisions of the Montreux Convention, in case of a conflict or war that 
Turkey is not a part of, the provisions for the commercial ships remain unchanged. 
But if Turkey is involved in a conflict, the ships of the states Turkey is not at war 
with can pass freely, while the ones of the states which participate to the conflict 
are the subject of the choices and decisions of the government in Ankara. 
Turkey will always be a bond between the Trans-Atlantic system and the 
Eurasian one12  and the Straits can be perceived as a sort of geopolitical and 
geostrategic pendulum. In 2006, the international attention focused again upon 
Turkish Straits, in the context of the United States insistence to extend NATO’s 
activities in the Black Sea, through “Operation Active Endeavour”13, when Turkey 
and Russia opposed. On the one side, Turkey feared of Russia’s reaction and of a 
possible unbalance of forces in the area; on the other side, Russia would have 
never accepted the idea that the American influence could grow in the Black Sea. 
Two years later, in 2008, Turkey was confronted again with the situation of not 
being able to decide if to rally on the West, or on Russia, in the Georgian crisis 
(where Turkey was quite “shy” to criticize Russian invasion), yet, due to its 
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 Joshua Goldstein, Jon C.Pevehouse, International Relations, Pearson Longman, London, 2007, p. 
124. 
11
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NATO’s membership, has allowed some US ships in the Black Sea, action that has 
enraged Russia. 14 
Taking into account the fact that Turkey is part of NATO, all the decisions 
of the Alliance in the Black Sea area depend on it. Taking a look upon the recent 
events in Ukraine, regarding the annexation of Crimea, Turkey was again 
confronted with the dilemma of supporting one side or another. Russia claims that, 
apparently, Turkey favoured U.S by breaking some articles from Montreux 
Convention, and argues this statement by bringing into attention the episode from 
July 2014, when the U.S navy warship USS Taylor, due to some technical issues, 
as it was officially declared, stayed 11 days over its limit15 (according to Montreux 
Convention the limit is 21 days16). What was not brought into the spotlight is the 
fact that Russia also had had an advantage, because, by using the Straits, it was 
easier to carry armament to Syria. 
 
What comes next? 
  
The Ankara’s leadership unveiled, in 2011, a new project, called “Kanal 
Istanbul Projesi” (Canal Istanbul), considered by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – at that 
time Turkey’s Prime Minister, now president of the country –, a big step in 
building the “New Turkey”. The aim of this “new Bosphorus Canal”17, which is 
expected to be finished by 2023, is to move the activity, the commercial shipping, 
from Bosphorus to Canal Istanbul. From Erdoğan`s declaration, the new channel is 
supposed to be around 45 kilometers long, 400 meters wide and 25 meters deep18. 
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 Mustafa Aydın, “Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power security agendas 
for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 
9, Issues 3, 2009, p. 280. 
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 Viorica Marin, “Expert rus: Rusia și Turcia ar trebui să negocieze închiderea strâmtorilor Bosfor 
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inchiderea-stramtorilor-bosfor-dardanele-navele-militare-statelor-non-riverane-marii-negre-
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 Article 18, paragraph 2, “Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in 
the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there”. 
Accessed: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-the-montreux-convention.en.mfa. 
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 The Guardian, “Istanbul's new Bosphorus canal 'to surpass Suez or Panama”, 27 April 2011, 
Accessed: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/27/istanbul-new-bosphorus-canal. 
18
 The declaration of the Turkish prime-minister, today`s president, R.T. Erdoğan, “Karadeniz ile 
Marmara Denizi arasına ‘Kanal İstanbul’ yapıyoruz”, din 27 aprilie 2011. Accessed: 
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx 
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Reading behind the lines, this is a will for an independent foreign policy, a 
tendency to form an energetic bond between Central Asia, Middle East and Black 
Sea. 19  
Even though nowadays Turkey has all the necessary instruments to control 
and monitor the ships’ transit in the Straits, the responsibilities are not very 
different from the ones in 1936, however, the international context is changed: 
Turkey is part of North Atlantic Alliance, which means that NATO’s actions in 
Black Sea depend on Turkey, yet things are not that simple. An eventual 
enlargement of NATO into the Basin of Black Sea, through the Turkish 
partnership, could be perceived as a threat by Russia. This will eventually lead to a 
need of reshaping Turkish interests in the area, therefore, an eventual Turkish 
hesitation will be perceived as vulnerability.  
“The crazy project” (“Çılgın Proje”), as many Turks called the new channel 
(inclusively Erdoğan, the only difference being that, in his vision, “crazy” has a 
positive connotation in this context)20, aims to cut the traffic through Bosphorus, 
and to connect Black Sea and Marmara Sea; it is obvious that an important part of 
the oil coming from Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia to the 
Mediterranean will be distributed to the biggest oil companies from all around the 
world. This project not only seems, but it is, indeed, an ambitious one, because 
Turkey wants to build a parallel channel with Bosphorus, as well as a new town, 
near Istanbul, that can host more than 3 million people and worth an investment of 
about 30 mld dollars21.  
Summing up, the advantageous position of Turkey near the Straits offered, 
during the past two centuries, the best card in negotiations with the great powers, 
and the key in controlling and supervising the activity in the area (a great 
achievement being the Montreux Convention), but it was also a bone of contention, 
especially in the Turkish-Russian relations, both willing to eliminate security 
                                                                                                                                       
?Id=32d07aaf-7097-4459-9f0b-bf9f79c20fd1.  
19
 Christian Keller, “Kanal Istanbul: Pipedream or Politics?”, Institut Français des relations 
internationales, 27 July 2011. Accessed: 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/christiankellerfinal.pdf. 
20
 Hürriyet Daily News, “Gov’t gives green light to ‘crazy’ Canal Istanbul project”,  13 April 2013. 
Accessed: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/govt-gives-green-light-to-crazy-canal-istanbul. 
21
  Constanța Cătălina Apostoiu, „Dacă devine realitate, Canalul Istanbul va aduce cele mai mari 
petroliere ale lumii în Marea Neagră”, Ziarul financiar, 22 mai 2011. Accessed: 
http://www.zf.ro/business-international/daca-devine-realitate-canalul-istanbul-va-aduce-cele-mai-
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issues. In order to understand and to identify the trends of the involved actors’ 
behaviors in this space, one way is to follow the line of events, to spot the 
similarities and the evolution of interests, yet this does not mean that one can 
predict the future. 
For a long time Turkey seemed to be satisfied with the control of the 
Straits, but the year 2011 changed this view. What seemed just an electoral 
promise became a serious project and the proof is that, in 2013, the Turkish 
government authorized the money allocation for this new channel22.  Now that the 
world had seen this is more than a declarative ambition, we can spot some 
dilemmas: firstly, can the blend of cold and warm, of sweet and salt, of Black and 
Marmara Seas be possible without any environmental and economic consequences 
for the countries along these seas?  Another question is: how will the map of Black 
Sea Basin would look like by 2023?  
This fall, before the G-20 summit, the C-20 summit took place in Turkey, 
and even though many members of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
supported this mega project, World Wildlife Foundation Turkey delivered a report 
entitled “Ya Kanal ya Istanbul” (“Either the Kanal or Istanbul”), warning that this 
project implies reshaping Istanbul, population movements, local instability and 
huge economic investments, of about billions of dollars23. Looking at all of these 
issues, how is the new Istanbul going to look like? 
Secondly, taking into account that this is a Turkish project entirely, this 
means that Turkey will be able to bring into the Black Sea aircraft carriers, without 
any international supervision. Also, although the new channel will be an open one, 
including for Russian oil tankers, the question still remains: how tempting will it 
be for Russia, not only economically, but geopolitical and geostrategic, since 
Russia sees in this project a sort of American tool: “the new canal is needed by the 
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 Cengiz Aktar, “Erdogan's 'megalomaniac' projects”, Al Jazeera, 25 March 2014, Accessed: 
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201432012171661127.html.  
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Projesinin. Ekolojik, Sosyal ve Ekonomik Değerlendirmesi, October 2015, Istanbul, accessed at: 
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50915.pdf. See also Erbatur C̨avuşoğlu, Julia Strutz, “Producing force and consent: Urban 
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US to boost its influence in the region and Russia will not be pleased with the 
fact”24.  
Not long ago, the Turkish prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated that the 
three most important principles of Turkish foreign policy are: “to keep close 
relations with neighbors”, “to develop relations with distant regions” and to have a 
“rhythmic diplomacy”25, but, so far, none of these aims are fulfilled yet. Turkey 
seems to look for a “strategic depth”26 based on national identity and geographical 
position, and one of the main goals is to be a dominant regional power but, this 
regional interest clashes with a similar Russian interest.  
The foreseeable future becomes unpredictable when the equation has two 
ambitious actors, but reading between the lines, gestures and declarations, the 
focus tends to move from the Straits to the new Turkish project that plans to 
replace Bosphorus. If this project will, indeed, succeed, Turkey will be a crucial 
actor on two continents; this will be a strength for NATO due to Turkey`s 
partnership, but a major weakness will be represented by Russian perception. 
Russian’s fear of insecurity, the animosity toward United States, the skeptical 
attitude toward West, and the competition with Turkey are well known. We can 
guess Turkish intentions but, what will be the next Russian step? Actually, who 
will surprise us next? 
 
Bibliography  
 
Books and articles 
Aydın, Mustafa, „Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power 
security agendas for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative”, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 271-
285 
 
                                                 
24
 Sergey Duz, “Turkey’s “new Bosporus”: risks and benefits”, Sputnik, 26 April 2013, Accessed: 
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_04_26/Turkey-s-new-Bosporus-risks-and-benefits/. 
25
 See Ahmet Davutloglu, Stratejik Derinlik Turkiye‘nin Uluslararasi Konumu, Istanbul, Kure 
Yayinlari, 2001; 
Itir Özer-imer, Jacek Kugler, Hilton L. Root, “Turkey and the West: Bargaining for Realignment”, 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2013, No. 21, Issue 2, p. 233. 
26
 Stephen F. Larrabee, “Turkey's New Geopolitics``, Survival,  No. 52, Issue 2, 2010, p.158. 
 
Daniela Popescu                                                                                RJHIS 2 (2) 2015 
 
242 
 
Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu, „Turkish‐Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling 
geopolitical  competition with economic partnership”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 
1, Issue 1, 2000, pp. 59-82. 
Davutloğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik Turkiye‘nin Uluslararasi Konumu, Kure 
Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2001 
Deluca, Anthony R., „Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 503-524 
Caminos, Hugo, Gogliati-Bantz, Vincent P., The Legal Regime of Straits. 
Contemporary Challenges and Solutions, Cambridge University Press, 
London, 2014 
C̨avuşoğlu, Erbatur,  Strutz, Julia, “Producing force and consent: Urban 
transformation and corporatism in Turkey”, City, No. 18, Issue 2, 2014, 
pp.134-148 
Erkin, Feridun Cemal, Türk-Sovyet ilişkileri ve Boğazlar meselesi, Ankara, 1968 
Fenwick, C. G., „The New Status of the Dardanelles”, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October, 1936), pp. 701-706 
Goldstein, Joshua, Pevehouse, Jon C., International Relations, Pearson Longman, 
London, 2007 
Gökay, Bülent, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991. Soviet Eastern 
Policy, Tureky and communism, Routledge London & New York, New 
York, 2006 
Hlihor, Constantin, Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale 
contemporane, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, 
București, 2005 
Hudson, Valerie M., „Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-SpecificTheory and the 
Ground of International Relations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, no. 1, 2005, 
pp. 1–30 
Hurewitz, J. C., „Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of 
the Problem”, World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 4 (July, 1962), pp. 605-632 
Keller, Christian, „Kanal Istanbul: Pipedream or Politics?”, Institut Français des 
relations internationales, 27 July 2011 
Knight, H. Gary, „The Kiev and the Turkish Straits”, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 125-129 
Larrabee, Stephen F. , “Turkey's New Geopolitics”, Survival, No.52, Issue 2, 2010, 
pp. 157-180 
Oran, Baksın, Türk Dış Politikası. Kurtuluş savaşından bugüne olgular, blegeler, 
yorumlar, Cilt II, 1980-2001, İletişim, Istanbul, 2002 
Özer-imer, Itir, Kugler Jacek, Root, Hilton L., “Turkey and the West: Bargaining 
for Realignment”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2013, No. 
21, Issue 2, pp. 218-251 
RJHIS 2 (2) 2015 
 
 
243 
 
Wenger, Martha, „Turkey”, Middle East Report, No. 160, Turkey in the Age of 
Glasnost (September - October, 1989), pp. 23-26 
 
Newspapers 
The Guardian, London, 27 April 2011 
Hürriyet, 27 April 2011 
Ziarul financiar, Bucharest, 22 May 2011 
Sputnik, 26 April 2013 
 
